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Abstract 
The paper examines determinants of electoral entry and success of ethnic minority parties in 
central and eastern Europe. The application of a hierarchical selection model shows that the 
strategic entry of minority parties depends on their expected electoral success due both to 
observed and unobserved factors. Drawing on formal models of electoral entry, the electoral 
success of new (or niche) parties is expected to be influenced by the costs of entry 
(determined by electoral thresholds) and the potential for electoral support. The latter depends 
on the reactions of political competitors and electoral demand, measured here as the size of 
ethnic groups and the saliency of ethnic issues. In line with these expectations, parties only 
run if they can expect electoral support sufficient to pass the electoral threshold. This finding 
would have been overlooked by a naïve model of electoral success which does not take self-
selection into account. 
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1. Introduction 
A strong body of empirical research on ethnic conflict provides a clear outlook on the 
consequences if ethnic minorities are not politically integrated: The political inclusion of 
ethnic minorities helps to contain ethnic conflict ( [Schneider and Wiesehomeier, 2008], 
[Alonso and Ruiz-Rufino, 2007], [Cohen, 1997] and [Saideman et al., 2002]). In times of 
peace, an impact in favour of ethnic minorities regarding legislation (Preuhs, 2006), political 
participation (Banducci et al., 2004) and support for the political system ( [Norris, 
2004] and [Pantoja and Segura, 2003]) is attributed to political representation of social 
minorities. Descriptive representation (through members of the own group) is a key aspect of 
political inclusion (Mansbridge, 1999). The abrupt introduction of political pluralism in 
previously autocratic systems in a number of central and eastern European countries fuelled 
tensions in particular along an ethnic dimension ( [Gurr, 1993], [Gurr, 2000], [Fowkes, 
2002] and [Evans and Whitefield, 1993]). At the same time, the young age of the democracies 
rules out long-term voter dissatisfaction as a powerful explanations for the success of ethnic 
parties (Kitschelt, 1995) and clears the way to focus on a different set of political-institutional 
variables. Therefore, the region is highly suitable for an analysis of the success of ethnic 
minority parties, defined as parties aiming at representing and mobilising voters of an ethnic 
minority group (Ishiyama and Breuning, 1998: p. 4; Chandra, 2011). They are an important 
way how ethnic minority groups get represented in the political institutions.3 We define 
ethnicity as a common view of a group identity, based on aspects such as cultural habits, 
language, religion, regional belonging, or race, connotated with a common ethnic label (Hale, 
2008: p. 47). 
Against this backdrop, the lack of comparative quantitative studies on the formation, electoral 
success and parliamentary representation of ethnic minority parties in central and eastern 
Europe is surprising. Most existing research takes on a case-oriented design (e.g. Barany, 
2002). There are a few comparative studies which have focused on the electoral success of 
ethnic minority parties (Hansen, 2006) or the parliamentary representation of ethnic 
minorities ( [Kostadinova, 2007] and [Bochsler, 2011]). These studies emphasize the 
relevance of institutional, cultural and socio-economic factors and provide tailored 
explanations for the representation of ethnic minorities. On the other hand, there is a rich body 
of literature systematically assessing the electoral fate of small, niche or new parties, in 
particular on radical right-wing parties. This research has not been fully utilized to study 
ethnic parties, let alone in central and eastern Europe.4 
The paper aims at closing this gap and seeks to capitalize on the theoretical and 
methodological advances made in the study of niche parties to explain the electoral entry and 
success of ethnic minority parties in central and eastern Europe. This research question 
contains two interrelated parts, first, the presence of ethnic minority parties in electoral 
politics (entry), second, the success of these parties in terms of vote shares. These parts are 
analyzed simultaneously.5 
Niche parties are defined as rejecting traditional class-based politics, raising issues cross-
cutting existing lines of political divisions, and limiting their issue appeals (Meguid, 2005). 
Ethnic parties fit these criteria, as they generally mobilize on criteria beyond class politics and 
traditional socio-economic or social liberalism cleavages, highlighting issues of minority 
representation and targeting ethnic minority voters. Our study takes a comprehensive view, 
reconciling the broader literature on niche party success with the narrower topic of minority 
representation in central and eastern Europe. The wider literature offers insights from the 
Political Opportunity Structure approach ( [Eisinger, 1973] and [Kitschelt, 1986]) and formal 
models of electoral entry of new parties ( [Cox, 1997] and [Hug, 2001]). The former 
conceptualizes resources of actors and their political-institutional context as constraints in the 
mobilization of social groups. Similarly, the latter conclude that the costs of electoral entry 
(depending e.g. on electoral thresholds), the potential electoral support or the saliency of 
issues new or niche parties draw on and the benefits of office (Cox, 1997) or of getting high 
demands accepted by mainstream parties (depending e.g. on the degree of power sharing in 
the political system; see Hug, 2001) influence the decision of electoral entry as well as the 
electoral success (Hug, 2001) of new or niche parties. 
After discussing these streams of literature, the study explains the emergence and the success 
of ethnic minority parties through the institutionally imposed entry costs and the potential 
electoral support, looking both at the electoral demands and at the strategic reaction of 
mainstream parties to ethnic demands. Besides classical explanations such as the (properly 
measured) electoral threshold and population shares, the reactions of political competitors 
constitute a factor which is extensively discussed in the literature (mainly in a western 
context, see e.g. Art, 2007; [Levi and Hechter, 1985], [Meguid, 2005], [Meguid, 
2008] and [Tronconi, 2006]) but not considered in the empirical applications covering central 
and eastern Europe we are aware of.6 
At the same time, we improve in methodological terms. Some previous studies do not include 
all relevant minorities in their analysis ( [42] and [Kostadinova, 2007]). Further, the 
comparative studies either neglect the hierarchical character of data on minorities in countries 
or avoid them at a tough price by including only one minority per country (Kostadinova, 
2007). The electoral system is regularly measured rather crudely with a dummy variable for 
its type (Kostadinova, 2007) or variables such as district magnitude (Hansen, 2006). Both 
variables are not very relevant for minorities that live concentrated in a small area, whereas 
high legal electoral thresholds can restrict minority representation (Bochsler, 2011). 
Furthermore, most of these studies concentrate more on parliamentary representation without 
disentangling the preceding steps of entry and electoral success (but see Stroschein, 2001). 
Consequently, imminent problems of selection bias cannot be dealt with, and if (Hansen, 
2006), this does not take place at the decisive level of entry into the electoral race. 
In addition to paying attention to case selection, the hierarchical character of the data and the 
proper measurement of electoral rules, we particularly tackle the problem of self-selection and 
consider two distinct levels which are equally important aspects of ethnic representation. The 
entry of a minority party into the electoral race foregoes any chances to win votes, gain seats 
in parliament or participate in government. Neglecting this stage would have serious 
consequences for the validity of our conclusions in regard to the factors influencing the 
electoral success of minority parties. If abstentions from entering the electoral arena are non-
random, as we expect them to be, results concerning the determinants of electoral success 
derived from the self-selected sample may be severely biased (King et al., 1994: p. 135; Hug, 
2003). This risk of selection bias requires a simultaneous analysis of the entry decision and 
the subsequent electoral success to be able to control for such problems. After controlling for 
selection bias, factors associated with the probability of electoral support and costs of 
electoral entry, namely the interaction between thresholds of representation and population 
shares and the saliency of ethnicity influence the electoral success of ethnic minority parties. 
Alarmingly, most of these findings would have been overlooked by a naïve model of electoral 
success which does not take self-selection into account. 
In the subsequent sections, we attempt to capitalize on the theoretical and methodological 
advances provided by the wider literature on new or niche parties in order to explain the 
emergence and success of ethnic minority parties in central and eastern Europe. 
2. Electoral success of ethnic minority parties in central and eastern Europe 
The field of ethnic minority representation in central and eastern Europe is dominated by case 
studies, which cover single or a small number of countries (instead of many: [Alionescu, 
2004] and [Barany, 2002]). Only a few studies have concentrated on the determinants of the 
electoral entry and success of ethnic minority parties or the parliamentary representation of 
ethnic minorities in central and eastern Europe from a comparative perspective ( 
[Kostadinova, 2007] and [42]). Bochsler’s (2011) focal variables in his analysis of descriptive 
parliamentary representation are the size and organizational capacity of ethnic minorities. 
Controls for the electoral system, geographic concentration and historical relations between 
minority and majority population are introduced as well. Analyzing data on 19 countries in 
2007, Bochsler (2011) emphasizes the influence of ethnic minorities’ population shares as 
well as of proportional electoral systems on minority representation. Similar findings 
regarding electoral systems are reported by Kostadinova (2007), who widens the focus on 
women and ethnic minority representation in parliament while covering 33 elections in 15 
central and eastern European countries. Only the largest ethnic minority per country is 
included in the study (Kostadinova, 2007: p. 423), which avoids problems associated with the 
multilevel structure of the data, but results in the loss of a multitude of cases per country. 
Hansen (2006) conceptualizes political institutions as intervening structures between ethnic 
cleavages and political outcomes and incorporates the resources of ethnic minorities, the 
degree of their discrimination and the political opportunities as critical for the mobilization of 
ethnic minorities. The relationships are tested using a Heckman selection model of 
parliamentary representation and seat shares of ethnic minority parties from 57 elections in 17 
countries. The minorities included are derived from the Minorities at Risk dataset (Gurr, 
2000). District magnitude and ethnic minorities’ population share display the expected 
positive relationships with seat shares of ethnic minority parties, while religious, cultural and 
economic differences between minority and majority population as well as discrimination 
carry the reverse sign. 
As argued above, these studies provide valuable insights, but offer several potential areas of 
improvement. Theoretically, they do not fully utilize the framework provided by the wider 
literature on new or niche parties (e.g. Hug, 2001). Methodologically, the selection of cases, 
the measurement of electoral hurdles, the lack of adequate multilevel methodology, and the 
modelling of self-selection processes are access points to improve on prior research. In the 
sections to follow, these aspects are addressed and solutions are suggested. 
The study at hand draws on the concept of the “Political Opportunity Structure” from research 
on social movements ( [Eisinger, 1973], [Kitschelt, 1986] and [Opp, 1996]) and on models of 
the strategic entry behaviour of new or niche parties ( [Cox, 1997] and [Hug, 2001]). The 
Political Opportunity Structure approach is explicitly transferred to analyses of minority 
representation (Bird, 2005) and the success of niche parties (Arzheimer and Carter, 2006). In 
his study of anti-nuclear movements in four countries, Kitschelt (1986: 58) defines the 
Political Opportunity Structure as “comprised of specific resources, institutional 
arrangements and historical precedents for social mobilization, which facilitate the 
development of protest movements in some instances and constrain them in other”. The 
concept of a Political Opportunity Structure proposes a focus on different levels which is also 
appropriate for the question of minority representation. If a minority group, which is 
understood here as comprised of both potential voters and political elites, seeks representation 
via an ethnic minority party, its own as well as contextual features are decisive for success. 
On the minority group level, the resources at disposition are a factor. Such resources could be 
of socio-economic or socio-cultural nature. At the same time, the political-institutional 
context and its responsiveness are emphasized, which allows for or inhibits representation 
(Bird, 2005). This is also the focus of the consociational theory (Lijphart, 1977) and 
resembles neo-institutionalist thinking in general, with actors nested in institutional contexts ( 
[Scharpf, 1997], [Mayntz and Scharpf, 1995] and [Hall and Taylor, 1996]). 
Critics of the Political Opportunity Structure approach point at the importance of considering 
the motivations and interests of the actors (Opp, 1996). A related problem is the fuzziness of 
the concept. Often, a very wide range of factors is subsumed under its label (e.g. Arzheimer 
and Carter, 2006). Against this backdrop, a plausible extension is the assumption of 
instrumentally rational minority elites and voters which seek to maximize their benefit (office, 
policy, or votes) while minimizing their costs ( [Cox, 1997] and [Hug, 2001]). In his seminal 
1997 book on electoral systems, Gary W. Cox discusses formal models of strategic entry. The 
central conclusion is that “[…] such models show that the number of entrants is not limited by 
anticipations of strategic voting when everyone has an ex ante equal chance of suffering (or 
benefiting) from it. The only limits that are placed on the number of entrants in equilibrium 
have to do with the costs of entry and the benefits of office” (Cox, 1997: p. 152). In sum, Cox 
(1997) identifies three factors which determine levels of electoral entry. These are the costs of 
entry, the benefits of office and the probability of electoral support. Simon Hug (2001) 
presents a game-theoretical model of the emergence of new parties. The heart of the model is 
the perception of new party emergence as a strategic interaction between the group with 
potential to field a new party and, for a start, one established party. Hug (2001: p. 46) 
describes the actions involved in the game as a dynamic process where either a strong or weak 
potential new party emerges, makes a high or low demand, which can be accepted or rejected 
by the established party, what enables the potential new party to give in or to form and 
compete for election. The most intriguing aspect of Hug’s (2001) formal model is that it 
allows the explicit discussion of results and outcomes as well as the formulation of empirical 
implications.7 The first empirical implication pertains to the saliency of new issues. A second 
implication cites formation costs which could hinder the formation of parties. The third 
empirical implication is that more parties will form when the benefits of getting demands 
accepted by mainstream parties are higher. A fourth implication refers to “fighting costs”, 
which manifest themselves in electoral thresholds, for example. The fifth and final 
implication is the flip side of the fourth. It implies that higher electoral benefits encourage 
weak parties to enter the electoral race. 
It has to be noted that Hug (2001) provides a theory of new party entry, not success. While he 
empirically analyses both the entry and success of new parties, Hug (2001: 6, 125–6) 
emphasizes that his theory is incomplete for explaining success. Nevertheless, he maintains 
that some of the implications for new/niche party formation are based on expectations about 
electoral success (Hug, 2001: p. 125), including the costs of the electoral fight (depending e.g. 
on electoral thresholds), issue saliency (equalling the probability of electoral support, 
determined by e.g. population size), and the benefits of getting demands accepted (depending 
e.g. on certain types of the degree of power sharing in the political system, such as the number 
of parties in government). The entry decision is based on the same plus two more factors, 
namely the formation costs of parties (e.g. depending on party financing and ballot access) 
and the benefits for weak challengers, the latter being measured using the same indicators as 
the electoral fighting costs, as both variables are highly related (Hug, 2001: p. 87–8).8 
Furthermore, Hug (2001) derives often counterintuitive expectations from his model 
considering the strategic decisions of mainstream and new parties theoretically, such as that 
rather strong parties might emerge given high electoral thresholds (Hug, 2001: 59, 138). 
Finally, that a factor increases the probability of new parties entering the electoral race does 
not necessarily mean that these parties are more successful. Such diverging expectations will 
also be formulated in the hypotheses to follow. 
Both the Political Opportunity Structure approach as well as the formal Rational Choice 
approaches point at similar determinants of electoral entry and success. The latter are useful 
as they provide a more parsimonious model which explicates the mechanisms involved in 
niche party entry and success. The paper at hand aims at testing several implications of the 
models of niche party success proposed by Cox (1997) and Hug (2001), while using new 
empirical observations. The empirical implications tested here can be understood in terms of 
the main decisions minority elites and voters face, which are encompassing the costs of 
electoral entry, measured by the strength electoral rules, and mainly the probability of 
electoral support, influenced by electoral demands (which are measured using the saliency of 
ethnicity and population shares of minorities) and reactions of mainstream parties for electoral 
success.9 These three country- or minority-level explanations are also central in the wider 
literature treating new, small, or niche parties. A sociological stream argues that the demand 
in the electorate drives the success of these parties (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967). On the other 
hand, political-institutional approaches offer two more explanations. First, the permissiveness 
of the political system, in particular the electoral system, is deemed crucial in the entry 
decision and success of minority parties (Duverger, 1963). Furthermore, the reactions of 
mainstream parties towards the “new” issues are of relevance for the success of niche parties 
(Meguid, 2005). These arguments are discussed in turn and hypotheses are derived. The 
implications for electoral entry and success are considered separately where applicable. 
The starting point for the analysis has to be the demand for minority representation and its 
strength. Where there is no ethnic cleavage, or where it is overwhelmed by other, more salient 
cleavages, ethnic representation is simply not needed and the probability of electoral support 
approaches zero. In the case of minorities, data on the saliency of ethnic issues is needed. In 
the period of transition and of state-building, when ethnic relations in young states are re-
negotiated, ethnicity becomes a relevant element of social identification, so that ethnic 
minority groups constitute a group that might aim for political representation (Birnir, 2007). 
Therefore, we treat those citizens who share a minority identity as a group with new political 
demands, and the population share of minority groups might be the best available 
approximation to measure them. The measure should also be associated with the saliency of 
ethnic issues.10 As population shares are an incomplete measure of electoral support, expert 
judgements of the saliency of the ethnic cleavage are considered as a supplement. Generally, 
demands are only probabilistically translating into electoral support. 
Social demands for representation are not sufficient to explain party formation, as research on 
the number of parties in political systems has shown ( [Amorim Neto and Cox, 1997], 
[Benoit, 2002], [Kostadinova, 2002] and [Ordeshook and Shvetsova, 1994]). In addition, the 
electoral structure has to be permissive. Conversely, permissive electoral rules will only result 
in more parties if there is demand for them. This equals an interaction between electoral rules 
and societal heterogeneity as the explanation for the emergence of parties. Similarly, for the 
minority-level approach advanced here, in particular population size should have an intuitive 
interactive relation with the electoral structure as an explanation for ethnic minority party 
entry and success, as population shares and electoral thresholds are measured in comparable 
units (per cent of the population and per cent of voters, respectively). If the share of 
(minority) voters is large enough to pass the electoral threshold, electoral success is achieved. 
‘Strong’ electoral systems impose high costs on electoral entry (Duverger, 1963). The 
consociational theory ( [Lijphart, 1977] and [Lijphart, 1991]) focuses largely on political 
institutions, in particular electoral structures. The dominant view is that proportional 
representation is associated with higher levels of minority representation through ethnic 
minority parties. However, the results from simple categorizations of proportional and 
majoritarian are not clear cut: Some studies support the hypothesis ( [Golder, 2003], [Jackman 
and Volpert, 1996], [Redding and Viterna, 1999], [Tavits, 2006] and [Willey, 1998]), while 
others find evidence for no ( [Harmel and Robertson, 1985], [Hauss and Rayside, 1978], 
[Meguid, 2005] and [Van der Brug et al., 2005]) or even a negative relationship between 
proportional representation and the success of new parties (Müller-Rommel, 1993). For the 
present sample, a simple dummy variable for the electoral structure is deeply inappropriate. 
While the electoral systems in central and eastern Europe either belong to the PR family, or 
are mixed systems, district and parliament sizes vary considerably, and some countries 
impose very considerable legal thresholds, so that they are not permissive enough to allow 
ethnic minorities to become represented. A finer measure is needed, which will be introduced 
below. Electoral demand and electoral rules (and their interaction) are expected to have the 
same implications for entry and for success. 
H1 Restrictive electoral rules will only reduce the probability of electoral entry and the extent 
of electoral success of ethnic minority parties when demand for minority representation is 
low. 
In addition to electoral demands and institutional constraints by the electoral system, the 
ability and willingness of other parties in the system to react to minority interests influences 
the electoral fate of minority parties by changing the probability of electoral support. 
[Meguid, 2005] and [Meguid, 2008] distinguishes three basic strategies of main parties, 
namely adversarial, accommodative, and dismissive reactions. At this point, there are 
differentiated expectations for electoral entry and success.11 Accommodation should make the 
entry of ethnic minority parties less likely, as the competitors offer the representation of 
minority interests. Their relative advantage, related to their size, is their higher potential to 
pass electoral thresholds, gain (possibly government) office and the more diverse policy 
package on offer, as ethnic minority voters might have more salient political issues than the 
ethnic one.12 The expectation for electoral success is less clear. Accommodation could 
diminish electoral chances of minority parties for the same reasons it reduces the probability 
of entry (Meguid, 2008). On the other hand, minority parties could be preferred as the 
accommodative reaction legitimizes the demands of the minority and they are perceived as the 
true advocates of the group (Arzheimer, 2009). 
On the other hand, the inter-ethnic outbidding logic suggests that, if there are adversarial 
reactions, minority voters might abandon moderate parties, and switch to minority parties as 
they constitute the only available representatives of minority interests (e.g. Saideman et al., 
2002: p. 108; Fearon, 2006: pp. 858–9; Rabushka and Shepsle, 1972: pp. 62–88). This should 
increase both the probability of entry, as ethnic issues become more salient without the 
perspective for the satisfaction of demands given adversarial reactions of mainstream parties, 
and the electoral success of ethnic minority parties, as minority voters and elites are mobilized 
(Meguid, 2008). 
Finally, if there are no reactions towards minority interests at all (controlling for demand), i.e. 
dismissive reactions, these are expected to represent a strong, suppressive variant of 
adversarial reactions, refusing the approval of the relevance of the issues the minority party 
puts forward (Meguid, 2008). It should be associated with higher levels of electoral entry 
(given some demand) on the one hand, as minority issues are not politically represented, but 
also with weaker electoral performances of ethnic minority parties on the other hand, as these 
have to establish the relevance of their demands by themselves. In sum, the expectations are: 
H2a Accommodative reactions of the competitors in the political system diminish the 
probability of electoral entry, while adversarial or dismissive reactions increase the 
probability of entry. 
H2b Adversarial reactions of the competitors in the political system increase the electoral 
success of ethnic minority parties, dismissive reactions decrease the extent of success, and 
there is no clear expectation for the effect of accommodative reactions. 
We refrain from incorporating further system-level variables such as the number of parties 
and party system polarization, as we are mainly interested in the focal relationships described 
and because these factors are partly consequences of electoral rules and societal 
heterogeneity. In the section to follow, design, data and measurement decisions are discussed. 
3. Data and measurement 
3.1. Design and case selection 
The study covers 19 post-communist democratic countries within the geographic borders of 
Europe: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Croatia, 
Hungary, Kosovo, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro, Poland, Romania, 
Serbia, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, and Ukraine. Within these, 130 ethnic minorities are 
examined. The basic units of analysis are ethnic groups, not single minority parties.13 All 
except for the largest ethnic groups in a country are defined as (numeric) ethnic minorities, 
including constituent ethnic groups, constitutional ethnic minorities, and not officially 
recognised ethnic minorities. Ethnic identities are often constructed against a cultural, 
historic, linguistic, physical or religious backdrop (see [Weber, 2002] and [Fearon, 2003]). 
Generally, the selection of ethnic minorities is highly problematic and always bears the risk of 
selection bias. Theoretically, the number of latent ethnic minorities approaches infinity (Hug, 
2003: p. 256). This fact stems directly from the definition of ethnic identity which refers to it 
as a social construction (Chandra and Wilkinson, 2008: p. 519). Prior research on ethnic 
minorities is often focused on “visible” minorities (Bird, 2005), minorities “at risk” (Hansen, 
2006) or the largest minority per country only (Kostadinova, 2007). All these selection rules 
carry the risk of causing severe selection bias and false inferences. There is a high probability 
that these groups differ systematically from other, non-regarded groups in aspects which we 
cannot control for. We attempt to minimize the problem by cross-validating data from official 
census statistics and state-independent sources, including the “Minorities at Risk” project 
(MAR) and information available from NGOs. We selected minorities on which information 
was available with a population share of 0.1 per cent or above. While official data arguably 
should be biased in favour of well-integrated minorities, state-independent sources allow us to 
identify groups that are discriminated against by the government.14 
Ethnic identities are very flexible, socially constructed concepts, and can be subject to 
political manipulation. In the introduction, we defined ethnicity as a common view of a group 
identity, based on aspects such as cultural habits, language, religion, regional belonging, or 
race, connotated with a common ethnic label (Hale, 2008: p. 47). In the countries under 
investigation, ethnic identities appear to be very stable and a clear-cut category and all ethnic 
groups have preceded the current political regimes and the formation of political parties. This 
facilitates our study, since with little risk we can treat ethnicity as an exogenous category for 
our purpose.15 The last election per country prior to the midst of 2007 was covered in the 
dataset, resulting in a cross-sectional multilevel design. 
3.2. Entry and electoral success of ethnic minority parties 
The dependent variables of the study at hand are the entry into to the electoral race and the 
subsequent electoral success of ethnic minority parties. We define ethnic minority parties as 
parties which clearly and overwhelmingly address an ethnic minority electorate, and whose 
main political goal is the representation of an ethnic minority (see also Horowitz, 1985: p. 
291). Entry into the electoral race is coded 1 for an ethnic minority if at least one party 
directed toward it has participated with an own list in the election, otherwise entry is coded 0. 
The information on participation is derived from official election results, which list all parties 
competing for votes.16Electoral success is defined as the sum of the vote share v of all ethnic 
parties representing the same ethnic minority in a country. 
Appendix 1 provides an overview of minority-related data in 19 central and eastern European 
countries. The table summarizes the number of minorities, their population shares, their 
parties’ election results in the last elections and the resulting number of seats in the national 
assembly. Minority groups that are not listed with a vote share value did not provide a party 
that participated for them in the election.17 The data indicates that the relationships between 
the minorities’ population shares and their vote shares as well as seat shares in the national 
assembly vary strongly between the countries of central and eastern Europe. While all 
minority groups in Kosovo and Romania – even those counting just 0.1 per cent of the 
population – are represented in the respective national assemblies, minorities in other 
countries are not represented at all, including groups counting more than 10 per cent of the 
suffraged population of a country (e.g. ethnic Russians in Estonia).18 
3.3. Electoral demands: population shares and the saliency of ethnic issues 
Sociological explanations suggest electoral demands as the driving force behind electoral 
success. As an initial proxy for electoral demands for parliamentary representation, we use the 
population share of ethnic minorities, regarding those eligible to vote. As Appendix 1 
indicates, the number of minorities varies rather strongly between countries, as do the sizes of 
the groups. Large minority groups like Russians in the Baltic States or Albanians in 
Macedonia are accompanied by very small minorities. In Montenegro, all minority groups 
combined represent a majority of the overall population, whereas minority population shares 
in Poland only add up to 0.6 per cent. 
Obviously, the population shares of ethnic minorities are an incomplete measure of the 
demand for minority representation. While large population shares should be associated with 
an increase in the demand for descriptive political representation, not every minority group 
member will place the most saliency on minority issues as such. To control for these different 
saliency levels at least at a general, national level, Benoit and Laver’s (2006) expert survey 
serves as an additional database (see Appendix 2). Here, country experts were asked not only 
to place parties on different policy dimensions, but also to judge the saliency of these policy 
dimensions. We rely on an expert survey that was carried out before our dependent variable 
was measured, what should reduce problems of endogeneity. As no question directly 
addresses ethnic minority issues, we rely on a question referring to state nationalism. Both 
issues are closely connected, as state nationalism in transition countries, and all the political 
questions related to it, such as state language or religious issues, also open up questions about 
the identity of ethnic minority groups and their rights. Consequently, we refer to this measure 
as the saliency of ethnicity, while highlighting that it is only an approximation. The mean 
importance of the issue across parties is weighted by the parties’ vote shares in order to 
measure overall policy salience of ethnic minority issues at the country level (Benoit and 
Laver, 2006: p. 243). 
3.4. Electoral systems 
Since the fall of the Iron Curtain, electoral systems in the post-communist countries of central 
and eastern Europe have undergone significant changes. Most of those changes have been 
implemented until 1995, after the countries had put in place their democratic constitutions 
(Armingeon and Careja, 2008: p. 439). As one of the major developments, almost all 
countries sooner or later adopted systems of proportional representation (PR). Out of the 19 
countries we examine in this article, for the elections that our study refers to, only Albania, 
Hungary and Lithuania have retained elements of majority representation.19 But not a single 
country in central and eastern Europe still holds its elections on the basis of a pure first-past-
the-post system (see Appendix 2). The sizes of the legislatures range between 42 in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina to 460 in Poland, with a mean of 192 representatives. The average district 
magnitude of all 19 countries equals 96 mandates. 
Regularly, the permissiveness of electoral systems is operationalized rather crudely through 
dummy variables for the type of the electoral system or through the mean or median district 
magnitude. We use the more precise Taagepera’s (2002) measure of the nationwide threshold 
of representation (for critical comments, see Bischoff, 2009).20 It reports the approximate vote 
share needed to gain a 50/50 chance of obtaining a seat in parliament and is computed as 
follows: 
 
Taagepera (2002) uses predictive modelling, which is adopted from physics, to determine 
theoretical boundaries of the threshold which are then empirically reconfirmed (Taagepera, 
2008). The resulting formula of the nationwide threshold T requires information on average 
district magnitude M and the assembly size S. The formula can be applied to any type of 
electoral system and does not presuppose any assumptions about the local concentration of 
groups. Rather, it represents a compromise which takes into account that from a nationwide 
perspective, much lower vote shares are sufficient to gain a majority in a single district where 
the voters are concentrated.21 The measure is explicitly designed and tested to accommodate 
even complex mixed electoral rules as assembly size captures compensatory seats well 
(Taagepera, 2002: p. 394–6). For the purposes of this analysis, the nationwide threshold 
generated by parliament and district sizes is replaced by the legal threshold in case the latter 
exists, exceeds the former, and applies to ethnic minorities (see Appendix 2). The national 
legal thresholds of representation (counting only those applicable to parties of ethnic 
minorities22) in the 19 countries vary between 0 and 6 per cent. Compared to the legal 
thresholds, the effective nationwide thresholds, measured as proposed by Taagepera (2002) 
are fairly low, and reach at maximum 2.41 per cent. Interestingly, this is the case in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, a country that has not put any legal obstacles in place, but with 42 seats, it 
has by far the smallest parliament of all countries. 
3.5. Special electoral rules and bans of ethnic parties 
Besides legal and effective thresholds, electoral rules also contain special rules for the 
election of ethnic minority representatives, apart from the countries that exempt parties of 
ethnic minorities from their legal thresholds. The approaches to ensure minority 
representation differ across the countries of central and eastern Europe. Most countries’ 
electoral laws do not provide for special regulations as regards the participation and 
representation of minority groups that live within their borders. Yet, a couple of countries 
have put in place several special regulations that are supposed to help minority parties achieve 
representation in parliament (Bochsler, 2010b). In Slovenia’s parliament, which consists of 90 
representatives, two representatives of the Italian and Hungarian minorities are elected 
separately by their groups. In Kosovo, 20 out of the 120 parliamentary seats are reserved for 
the country’s minorities. There is no special district for this minority vote. Minority parties 
take part in the same election as all other parties, but are awarded these additional 20 seats, 
based on quotas for each minority group. In Croatia, the Serb Community is entitled to elect 
three representatives; the other five mandates are split among the other minorities in the 
country. Each minority group (or several smaller minorities jointly) elect their representatives 
in special districts. In Romania, if the legal threshold is not surpassed, the minority is entitled 
one seat as soon as the number of votes for the largest of its parties equals at least 10 per cent 
of the average number of votes needed to elect a deputy. As mentioned above, exceptions 
from legal thresholds are considered in the coding of the thresholds generated by the electoral 
system. The other forms of special regulations for ethnic minorities, such as reserved seats, 
are accounted for using a dummy variable which is coded 1 if there are special regulations 
and 0 if there are not. The flip side of special electoral rules for minorities is bans of ethnic 
parties, which officially are applied in Albania and Bulgaria. Both these variables are 
introduced as controls at the stage of electoral entry.23 
3.6. Reactions of established parties 
We include a second politico-institutional context factor in the analysis: the reactions of 
mainstream parties when faced with small, ethnically based competitors. To measure these 
reactions, data from the Comparative Manifestos Project (CMP) is used, which provides 
content analyses of party manifestos (Klingemann et al., 2006).24 The data includes 
information on issue saliency and on the positioning of parties, covering a wide range of 
empirical policy areas. The most recent data is usually available for the election prior to the 
election for which electoral entry and success are measured.25 Therefore, the reactions of 
mainstream parties at the election date are approximated using the data from the last election. 
This requires some stability assumption of party positions. At the same time, earlier 
statements of mainstream parties might still be relevant for the decisions of voters. To 
construct the scale, in a first step, seven items which are related to the positioning of parties 
towards ethnic minority issues were selected from the project’s codebook.26 Three of these, 
including references to “Cultural Autonomy: Positive” (item 6071 in the CMP), 
“Multiculturalism pro Roma: Positive” (6072) and “Multiculturalism pro Roma: Negative” 
(6081) where not covered in the manifestos studied. Four relevant items, which also have 
non-zero entries and are subsequently used to compute the reactions scores, are “Minorities 
Abroad: Positive” (7052), referring to ethnic minorities living in the manifesto country and 
“Multiculturalism: Positive” (607) on the accommodative side.27 On the adversarial side 
“Multiculturalism: Negative” (608) and “National Way of Life: Positive” (601) are available. 
For each item, the percentage of quasi-sentences in the manifesto referring to it is reported. 
Following Meguid (2005), three variants of reactions could be theoretically considered: 
adversarial (negative) reactions, accommodative (positive) reactions, and also dismissal (no 
reactions at all). To identify one major rival mainstream party, the two largest available 
parties in terms of vote shares per country are considered.28 To capture the fact that the largest 
party is not necessarily the main competitor of the niche parties, we select the party per 
country which displays the most intense overall reaction, i.e. the sum of adversarial and 
accommodative reactions. This arguably reflects higher threat from the niche parties. For this 
mainstream party the net reactions are computed as the difference between accommodative 
and adversarial reactions, yielding an accommodative-adversarial scale.29 
4. Empirical analysis 
Studies of the electoral success of ethnic minority parties are prone to problems of selection 
bias ( [Hug, 2003] and [King et al., 1994]: p. 131; Selb and Pituctin, 2010). In a nutshell, the 
representational success of ethnic minority parties depends on their decision to enter the 
electoral race in the first place. The problem starts with self-selection. Minority elites will 
only field party in anticipation of success for particular reasons. Therefore, if studying only 
the existing parties of ethnic minorities, we end up with a sample of particularly “strong” 
minorities, while those who anticipate a failure do not even run for elections. For instance, 
due to demographic reasons (a disproportionally high share of under 18 years old with no 
voting rights) and their low literacy rate, the population share of Roma communities might 
overestimate the potential electoral support for Roma parties (UNPD, 2003: p. 74). 
Anticipating the difficulties of gathering sufficient electoral support, it is plausible that in 
certain countries with high electoral thresholds Roma parties do not even appear on the 
electoral ballot. Such a selection effect can impressively be observed in Serbia, where in the 
2003 elections, due to the high electoral threshold of 5 per cent, no Roma party was 
competing, and only one list of ethnic minorities was eligible, an alliance of several minority 
parties and a regional party, ran in elections. After lowering the threshold for minority parties, 
six minority parties decided to run with their own lists, including two parties of the Serbian 
Roma (Bochsler, 2008). As we can not control all of the reasons for the electoral success of 
ethnic minority parties, concomitant factors which are modelled will be underestimated, for 
example the effect of the electoral system. 
4.1. Model 
The problem of selection bias is countered by selection models (Heckman, 1979), which can 
also be formulated as hierarchical mixed distribution models (Selb and Pituctin, 2010).30 The 
basic idea behind Heckman’s (1979) selection model is to correct for self-selection bias. 
Conceptually, the aim is to control for the unobserved factors influencing both the selection 
into the sample and the outcome, which is done by accounting for the residuals from a 
selection equation in an outcome equation. These residuals carry the information we are 
interested in: the unknown reasons to enter the electoral race which are the same unknown 
reasons to be successful. 
Here, a flexible, one step version of the selection model is presented following Rabe-Hesketh 
(2002) and the application of the model to the electoral entry and success of niche parties by 
Selb and Pituctin (2010).31 The hierarchical structure of the model is three-fold: The highest 
level is that of countries. The middle level is comprised of minorities. So far, we have a 
conventional multilevel structure. To model selection bias, a third, even lower level is 
introduced: in each minority, two responses are nested, the decision to enter the electoral race, 
coded as yes (1) or no (0), and the electoral success expressed as vote shares in per cent. 
Hence the name mixed distribution model. Two equations are needed to estimate the model, 
which are linked through their correlated minority-level error terms to capture selection bias. 
The random intercepts probit model for electoral entry is presented as a latent hurdle model. 
 
Where the latent response denotes the propensity of electoral entry of minority i in country j. The 
observed entry decision is 1 if , otherwise it is 0. The response is modelled by a general 
intercept β0, a vector of individual-level covariates Xij (were β denotes a vector of coefficients) and a 
vector of country-level covariates Zj (were γ denotes a vector of coefficients) while controlling for 
country-level variance μ1j. For μ1j, a zero mean and a variance of are assumed. The individual-level 
residual ɛ1ij of the latent response is unobserved and conventionally assumed to be normally 
distributed with a mean of 0 and a variance of 1 in the probit model. The equation for electoral 
success is formulated in a similar fashion, but with a linear link function. 
yij=β0+βXij+γZj+μ2j+ɛ2ij 
Here, the vote shares yij of minority i in country j are modelled by a general intercept β0, a 
vector of individual-level covariates Xij (were β denotes a vector of coefficients) and a vector 
of country-level covariates Zj (were γ denotes a vector of coefficients) while controlling for 
country-level variance μ2j with the assumptions of a mean of zero and a variance of . The 
sets of covariates in the selection and the outcome equation do not need to be identical, and 
the identification of the model is eased if they are not, as is the case here. An individual-level 
residual ɛ2ij (normally distributed with variance σ2) is estimated. Both models are linked 
through correlated errors at the minority level, indicating potential selection bias which is 
captured via the estimation of a common factor explaining this correlation (Rabe-Hesketh, 
2002).32 The correlation represents the extent to which the unexplained part of the entry 
decision is linked to the unexplained part of electoral success. 
ρ(ɛ1ij,ɛ2ij)=cov(ɛ1ij,ɛ2ij)/1σ 
The correlation ρ(ɛ1ij,ɛ2ij) is the covariance of the error terms from the minority-level divided 
by the product of their standard deviations. All parameters can be estimated simultaneously 
using maximum likelihood methodology (Vella, 1998). 
4.2. Results 
Model 1 in Table 1 reports the results of a naïve linear multilevel model, which is solely 
based on the election results of the minority parties which actually entered the electoral race. 
Apart from population shares (in particular at low electoral thresholds), all other factors, 
including electoral thresholds at different population shares, the saliency of ethnicity and the 
reactions of political competitors fail to show statistically significant influence. Fig. 1 shows 
the estimated naïve marginal effect of the electoral threshold at different population shares, 
which, according to H1, should be negative and statistically significant for low population 
shares only, but appears to be empirically absent. 
Table 1. Naïve model of electoral success and hierarchical selection model of electoral 
entry and success. 
 
Model 1: naïve model 
Model 2: selection model 
 
 
Electoral success (vote 
share in per cent) 
Electoral entry 
(yes/no) 
Electoral success (vote 
share in per cent) 
Minority level 
Electoral demand: population 
share (per cent) 
0.81 (0.22)*** 1.29 (0.51)** 0.94 (0.04)*** 
Country level 
Threshold of representation 
(per cent) 
0.19 (0.66) −0.23 (0.22) −0.23 (0.11)** 
Electoral demand: saliency of 
nationalism 
0.07 (0.56) 0.20 (0.20) 0.22 (0.11)** 
Reactions of political 
competitors (ac.-ad.) 
−0.02 (0.14) −0.07 (0.08) 0.03 (0.02) 
Special electoral provisions 
 
2.01 (1.25)* 
 
Ban on ethnic parties 
 
−0.06 (0.73) 
 
Pop. share × Threshold −0.02 (0.07) −0.14 (0.10) −0.01 (0.01) 
Constant −2.68 (7.94) −4.92 (3.21) −6.97 (1.62) 
Variance constant 2.75 (1.40) 1.32 (1.37) 1.12 (0.43) 
ρ(ɛ1ij,ɛ2ij) (minorities) 
 
.81 
N (mixed responses) 
 
169 
N (minorities) 39 130 39 
N (countries) 18 19 18 
***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1. Regression coefficients reported; standard errors in 
parentheses. The naïve model is estimated using the xtmixed command in Stata. The 
second model is estimated using the gllamm package for Stata, specifying a 
hierarchical mixed distribution model. Both models are estimated using Maximum 
Likelihood. 
 Fig. 1. Naïve marginal effect of electoral threshold on success across population 
shares. 
Model 2 in Table 1 refers to the hierarchical selection model described above, which 
simultaneously estimates a model of electoral entry and success, catering for potential 
selection bias. An empty version of the model (not reported), which contains the fixed and 
random intercepts only, allows to compute intraclass correlations, which are country-specific 
variance shares. For electoral entry, the intraclass correlation equals .92, for electoral success, 
it equals .46. These context-induced variance shares are considerable and provide strong 
justifications to model the hierarchical data structure of minorities nested in countries. The 
results of the selection model with covariates are given in Table 1.33 There is strong evidence 
for the need to model potential selection bias: The correlation between the errors of both 
equations is a very high .81 at the minority level. In other words, those minorities which 
decide to compete in elections clearly are not a random sample of the existing minorities. 
Rather, only those with positive residuals, i.e. those who have some advantage which we 
cannot control for, will run for election. 
The stage of electoral entry is modelled to avoid selection bias in the analysis of electoral 
success but also substantially interesting in itself. For electoral entry, the results partly support 
the expectations regarding the influence of population shares in interaction with the electoral 
threshold. Interaction effects in logistic and probit regression and their statistical significance 
cannot be directly interpreted as they can vary widely depending on the values of the other 
covariates in the model (Norton et al., 2004). Therefore, the effect of a one-unit change in the 
electoral threshold from its mean on the predicted probability of entry as population size 
changes is displayed graphically in Fig. 2, using simulations to determine the uncertainty of 
the estimates (Brambor et al., 2005). The other covariates in the model are held at certain 
values, so that the effects are valid for minorities in countries with mean salience of ethnicity, 
mean reactions of competitors and no special electoral regulations or ban of ethnic parties. 
The results show that the predicted probability of electoral entry is negatively affected by 
electoral thresholds when the population size is small, but not when it is larger. At population 
sizes of about 4 per cent, the effect can be as large as a change of about −.25 in the predicted 
probability of entry for a one-unit change in the electoral threshold from its mean. Such 
magnitudes are very much in line with intuitive expectations about which groups suffer most 
from higher thresholds. 
 
Fig. 2. Marginal effect of electoral threshold on entry across population shares 
(selection model). 
The other factors in the model of electoral entry point in the expected direction, including the 
saliency of ethnicity, the reactions of political competitors34 and bans on ethnic parties, but 
except special electoral regulations, all of them miss conventional levels of statistical 
significance. 
Turning to the electoral success side of the model, the same set of variables as in Model 1 is 
introduced, but considering potential self-selection bias. The interaction between the electoral 
threshold and population shares indicates that higher electoral thresholds are associated with 
less success, but only when population shares are small. For the linear model of electoral 
success, this can be demonstrated in a graph of the marginal effect of the electoral threshold 
for different population shares, considering that the constitutive effects on electoral threshold 
refers to situations where the conditioning variable (population size) equals zero and that 
meaningful marginal effects and measures of uncertainty need to be computed for different 
levels of the moderating variable (following Brambor et al., 2005, see Fig. 3). 
 Fig. 3. Marginal effect of electoral threshold on success across population shares 
(selection model). 
The effect appears to be modest but statistically significant for small minorities, slightly more 
pronounced for medium-sized minorities and loses its statistical significance for large 
populations.35 A one-unit increase in the electoral threshold can result in a reduction of the 
electoral success of about −0.25 to −0.5 percentage points for minority populations between 0 
and 15 per cent. Furthermore, the saliency of ethnic issues is positively related to electoral 
success. The model predicts a 0.22 increase in vote shares for a one-unit increase in saliency 
(which is measured on a 1–20 scale). The reactions of political competitors still fail to reach 
levels of statistical significance, even after taking self-selection into account. In sum, the 
results lend support to Hypothesis 1 on the interaction between electoral rules and demands, 
but not for Hypothesis 2 on the reactions of political competitors. Remarkably, most of the 
findings are missed out when selection bias is not accounted for (see Model 1 and Fig. 1), 
including the interaction effect between the electoral threshold and population shares and the 
positive effect of the saliency of ethnicity. This observation strongly underpins the necessity 
to consider self-selection bias in research on niche party success. 
5. Conclusion 
The paper discussed and analyzed political-institutional and sociological determinants of 
electoral entry and success of ethnic minority parties. We report evidence that ethnic minority 
parties only run and succeed in elections if they find a sufficiently large basis of support in 
order to pass the electoral threshold. These results rely on several improvements of existing 
research. This paper draws on formal game-theoretical models to explain the entry and 
success of new parties ( [Cox, 1997] and [Hug, 2001]). Based on this theoretical basis, it 
incorporates the reaction of mainstream parties, improves beyond previous measures for the 
electoral system, and the applied methodology considers possible self-selection effects of 
strategic entry.36 
First, relying on the Political Opportunity Structure approach and formal models of the 
strategic entry behaviour of new parties, we study the costs of entry (electoral thresholds) as 
well as the probability of electoral support (reactions of competitors and electoral demands). 
The scarce prior studies on the success of ethnic minority parties did not fully take into 
account the advances in the wider literature on new or niche parties. 
Second, the operationalization of electoral structures is advanced beyond simple PR dummies, 
output measures such as the Gallagher (1991) index or thresholds of representation which 
apply to the constituency-level only. These classical measures appear as ill-suited for the 
study of the entry and success of ethnic minority parties, since ethnic minorities often live 
clustered in a small area. Therefore, the effect of small electoral districts is not the same as for 
other non-territorial divides. For our purpose, Taagepera’s (2002) national threshold of 
representation is used which attempts at a general, continuous input measure of representation 
valid across a wide range of electoral systems. 
Third, studies of the electoral success of new or nice parties have widely ignored self-
selection bias: Not all minorities decide to enter the electoral race; they rather self-select 
themselves into the sample of contenders. They are very likely to be advantaged in some 
sense we cannot control for. Therefore the risk of misjudging the impact of factors such as 
electoral thresholds is the logical consequence. This was encountered by introducing a 
selection model formulated as a hierarchical mixed distribution model. This model also is 
hierarchical in the sense that the nesting of minorities in countries is accounted for. Ignoring 
such dependencies between minorities leads to overconfidence in context effects. 
Most alarming, all the substantial findings of this paper, except the almost trivial positive 
effect of population shares at low electoral thresholds on electoral success, would have been 
overlooked if self-selection was not modelled. The results of the hierarchical selection model 
of electoral entry and success of ethnic minorities pointed at statistical significant influence of 
most of the explanations proposed after controlling for self-selection. The results of Model 2 
show that the factors affecting the electoral success and of entry have some commonalities. 
The decision to join the electoral competition is mainly determined by the expected electoral 
success (Hug, 2001). Only if the electoral support is likely to surpass the restriction imposed 
through electoral thresholds, minority parties are likely to run in elections. 
On the other hand, the reactions of political competitors (Meguid, 2008) fail to show any 
systematic influence, at least in the study at hand. Whether this is due to measurement issues 
or more systematic, for example because new democracies are studied (Hug, 2001: p. 6), is a 
matter for further research. The timing of elections has equally been black-boxed (Art, 2007). 
Such research could also incorporate additional minority-level data on mobilization resources, 
and should consider the consequences of descriptive representation ( [Pitkin, 
1967] and [Mansbridge, 1999]). The motivation of the research at hand was the expected 
positive effect of descriptive representation on the political integration of ethnic minorities. 
Several additional steps in this direction are needed to assess such effects, starting with policy 
congruence between ethnic minority members and their representatives, and political attitudes 
such as satisfaction with democracy among the minority population. 
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Appendix 1. Ethnic minorities, population shares, and electoral success. 
Country Election Min. group 
Pop. share 
(%) 
Vote share 
(%) 
Seat share 
(%) 
Albania 2005 
Macedonians 1.2 
  
South Slavs 1.2 
  
Vlachs 2.5 
  
Roma 3 
  
Greeks 4 0.89 1.43 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
2006 
Croat 17.3 8.64 11.90 
Serb 31.3 31.49 26.19 
Roma 0.1 
  
Slovene 0.1 
  
Bulgaria 2005 
Turks 9.5 11.93 14.17 
Vlachs 4.6 
  
Macedonians 2.9 
  
Roma 3.7 0.17 
 
Other slav-speaking 
muslims 
2.9 
  
Croatia 2003 
Hungarians 0.5 s.r.* 0.66 
Roma 0.2 
  
Slovene 0.5 
  
Serb 4.5 0.02 1.97 
Bosniaks 0.5 s.r.* 0.66 
Albanian 0.4 
  
Country Election Min. group 
Pop. share 
(%) 
Vote share 
(%) 
Seat share 
(%) 
Czech Republic 2006 
Roma 0.1 
  
Hungarians 0.1 
  
German 0.4 
  
Slovak 1.9 
  
Moravian 3.7 0.23 
 
Polish 0.5 
  
Silesian 0.1 
  
Ukrainian 0.2 
  
Estonia 2007 
Finnish 0.8 
  
Ukrainian 2.1 
  
Russian 13 1.20 
 
Belarusian 1.2 
  
Hungary 2006 
Slovak 0.2 
  
Roma 1.9 0.08 
 
German 0.6 
  
Kosovo 2004 
Gorani 1 0.20 0.83 
Serbs 7 0.25 8.33 
Roma 1.7 0.15 3.33 
Turks 1 1.21 2.5 
Bosniaks 1.9 1.10 3.33 
Latvia 2006 
Belarusian 1.4 
  
Ukrainian 0.6 
  
Lithuanian 0.9 
  
Country Election Min. group 
Pop. share 
(%) 
Vote share 
(%) 
Seat share 
(%) 
Russian 18.2 20.45 23 
Polish 2.2 
  
Jews 0.4 
  
Roma 0.4 
  
Germans 0.1 
  
Lithuania 2004 
Russian 8.2 
  
Belorusian 1.5 
  
Ukrainian 1 
  
Polish 6.9 3.79 1.42 
Macedonia 2006 
Roma 3 
  
Bosniak 0.8 
  
Albanian 22.9 20.13 23.33 
Serb 2 0.14 
 
Turkish 4 0.10 
 
Vlachs 0.5 
  
Moldova 2005 
Ukrainian 8.4 
  
Russian 5.9 3.75 
 
Romanian 2.2 
  
Gagauz 4.4 
  
Bulgarian 1.9 
  
Montenegro 2006 
Roma 0.42 
  
Serbs 31.99 14.68 16 
Croats 1.1 
  
Country Election Min. group 
Pop. share 
(%) 
Vote share 
(%) 
Seat share 
(%) 
Muslims 3.97 
  
Bosniaks 7.77 3.76 
 
Albanians 5.03 2.52 2.67 
Poland 2005 
Germans 0.4 0.34 0.43 
Belarussians 0.1 
  
Ukrainians 0.1 
  
Romania 2004 
Ukrainians 0.4 0.11 0.29 
Hungarians 8.5 6.17 6.36 
Turks 0.1 0.21 0.29 
Tartars 0.1 0.06 0.29 
Germans 0.9 0.35 0.29 
Slovaks 0.1 0.06 0.29 
Roma 6.4 0.70 0.29 
Serbs 0.1 0.07 0.29 
Lipovanians 0.1 0.10 0.29 
Serbia 2007 
Bosniaks 1.82 0.80 0.80 
Bunjevac 0.27 
  
Romanians 0.46 
  
Yugoslavs 1.08 
  
Ruthenians 0.21 
  
Albanians 0.82 0.30 0.40 
Croats 0.94 
  
Montenegrins 0.92 
  
Country Election Min. group 
Pop. share 
(%) 
Vote share 
(%) 
Seat share 
(%) 
Macedonians 0.35 
  
Slovaks 0.79 
  
Moslems 0.26 
  
Romanies 1.44 0.90 0.80 
Hungarians 3.91 1.50 1.20 
Bulgarians 0.27 
  
Vlachs 0.53 
  
Slovak Republic 2006 
Polish 0.1 
  
Roma 1.8 
  
Hungarian 10.6 11.68 13.33 
Czech 1.1 
  
Ruthenian 0.6 
  
German 0.1 
  
Ukrainians 0.2 
  
Slovenia 2004 
Croat 3 
  
Roma 0.2 
  
Serb 2 
  
Italians 0.1 s.r.* 1.11 
Hungarian 0.4 s.r.* 1.11 
Yugoslav 0.6 
  
Bosniak 1 
  
Albanians 0.3 
  
Montenegrians 0.1 
  
Country Election Min. group 
Pop. share 
(%) 
Vote share 
(%) 
Seat share 
(%) 
Macedonians 0.2 
  
Ukraine 2006 
Jewish 0.2 
  
Hungarians 0.3 
  
Poles 0.3 
  
Moldovan 0.5 
  
Greeks 0.2 
  
Crimean Tatars 0.5 
  
Bulgarians 0.4 
  
Belarusian 0.3 
  
Romanians 0.3 
  
Russian 17.3 3.05 
 
Tatars 0.2 
  
Armenians 0.2 
  
Roma 0.1 
  
Azeri 0.1 
  
Georgians 0.1 
  
Germans 0.1 
  
Gaugasians 0.1 
  
Sources: Official election results for vote and seat shares; official census statistics for 
population shares. See Bochsler (2011) for details. Note: *special rules (s.r.): These 
minorities did not have to compete in the regular elections because of provisions but 
gained parliamentary representation. 
Appendix 2. Politico-institutional context factors in 19 central and eastern 
European countries. 
Country 
Electio
n 
Type of 
elector
al 
system 
Number 
of 
mandat
es 
Average 
district 
magnitu
de 
Nationwi
de 
threshold 
(in %) 
Legal 
thresho
ld (in %) 
Saliency 
of 
nationalis
m 
Reactio
ns 
(ac.−ad.
) 
Special 
rules 
(1 = ye
s) 
Albania 2005 Mixed 140 12.14 1.68 2.5 10.9 0.88 0 
Bosnia 
and 
Herzegovi
na 
2006 PR 42 21 2.41 0 16.5 −1.65 0 
Bulgaria 2005 PR 240 240 0.31 4 11.8 0.49 0 
Czech 
Republic 
2006 PR 200 14 1.32 5 13.1 −7.36 0 
Estonia 2007 PR 101 9 2.24 5 11.2 −3.34 0 
Croatia 2003 PR 140 14 1.52 5 14.2 −3.52 1 
Hungary 2006 Mixed 386 4.81 1.44 5 14.2 −2.43 0 
Kosovo 2004 PR 120 100 0.65 (0) 15.1 −24.00 1 
Latvia 2006 PR 100 20 1.60 5 13.7 −5.97 0 
Lithuania 2004 Mixed 141 35.26 1.03 5 10.1 2.62 0 
Macedoni
a 
2006 PR 120 20 1.46 0 12.0 −1.57 0 
Moldova 2005 PR 101 101 0.74 6 13.2 11.43 0 
Monteneg
ro 
2006 PR 81 37.50 1.38 3 15.1 0.35 0 
Poland 2005 PR 460 11.20 0.96 (0) 11.8 0.44 0 
Romania 2004 PR 332 328 0.23 5 14.9 −0.99 1 
Serbia 2007 PR 250 250 0.30 (0) 15.1 0.00 0 
Slovak 
Republic 
2006 PR 150 150 0.50 5 13.4 −2.35 0 
Country 
Electio
n 
Type of 
elector
al 
system 
Number 
of 
mandat
es 
Average 
district 
magnitu
de 
Nationwi
de 
threshold 
(in %) 
Legal 
thresho
ld (in %) 
Saliency 
of 
nationalis
m 
Reactio
ns 
(ac.−ad.
) 
Special 
rules 
(1 = ye
s) 
Slovenia 2004 PR 90 11 2.19 0 11.3 −1.07 1 
Ukraine 2006 PR 450 450 0.17 3 14.9 −0.77 0 
Sources: Legal thresholds: OSCE Election Reports (http://www.osce.org/odihr-
elections/14207.html); District magnitudes, assembly sizes, system type: [Tiemann, 
2006], [Harfst, 2007] and [Shvetsova, 1999]; Saliency: Benoit and Laver (2006); 
Reactions: Klingemann et al. (2006), party manifestos of mainstream parties from 
Kosovo coded in line with the CMP scheme by experts contacted by the authors. Note: 
For the saliency of nationalism, the values of Serbia are assumed for Kosovo and 
Montenegro, likely underestimating the saliency in these states which are in the 
process of gaining independence. Legal thresholds of 0 are given in parentheses if they 
represent exceptions for minorities. For a description of special electoral rules for 
minorities see article text. In the “special rules”-variable, exceptions from legal 
thresholds are not considered. There are bans of ethnic parties in Albania and 
Bulgaria, coded as an additional dummy variable. 
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